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Abstract. The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary
biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an
advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the population.
Evolutionary game theory has shown that under certain conditions, cooperation
nonetheless evolves stably, for example if players have the opportunity to punish cheaters
that benefit from a public good yet refuse to pay into the common pool. However,
punishment has remained enigmatic because it is costly, and difficult to maintain. On
the other hand, cooperation emerges naturally in the Public Goods game if the synergy
of the public good (the factor multiplying the public good investment) is sufficiently high.
In terms of this synergy parameter, the transition from defection to cooperation can be
viewed as a phase transition with the synergy as the critical parameter. We show here
that punishment reduces the critical value at which cooperation occurs, but also creates
the possibility of meta-stable phase transitions, where populations can “tunnel” into the
cooperating phase below the critical value. At the same time, cooperating populations
are unstable even above the critical value, because a group of defectors that are large
enough can “nucleate” such a transition. We study the mean-field theoretical predictions
via agent-based simulations of finite populations using an evolutionary approach where
the decisions to cooperate or to punish are encoded genetically in terms of evolvable
probabilities. We recover the theoretical predictions and demonstrate that the population
shows hysteresis, as expected in systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling.
We conclude that punishment can stabilize populations of cooperators below the critical
point, but it is a two-edged sword: it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point.
ar
X
iv
:1
21
0.
52
33
v4
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
9 J
un
 20
15
1. Introduction
When individuals maximize their self-interest by exploiting a public good, they are often
doing so by harming their (and others’) own long-term interest, and create a social
dilemma termed the “tragedy of the commons” [1]. The tragedy of the commons is
often discussed in environmental politics (for example, overgrazing and overfishing), as
well as social science and politics (for example, vandalism and taxation) [1]. However, the
tragedy of the commons also plays an important role in evolutionary biology [2]: rate-yield
tradeoffs in bacterial metabolism [3], the evolution of virulence [4] and the manipulation
of a host by a group of parasites [5] can be viewed as a social dilemma involving a public
good. Social dilemmas [6] (such as the tragedy of the commons) can be studied within the
framework of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [7–12], which describes populations of
agents engaging in pairwise (or group wise) interactions, with defined payoffs for different
strategies. The tragedy of the commons is usually described by a particular game form
known as the “Public Goods” game.
The Public Goods game is a standard within the field of experimental economics [13–
15]. In this game, players possess tokens that they can invest into a common pool (the
public good). The total sum contributed by the players is then multiplied by a “synergy
factor” (creating a positive yield). This amount (typically larger than the invested sum)
is then equally distributed to the players in the pool, irrespective of whether they invested
or not. A group of players maximizes their investment if all the players contribute (so
as to take maximum advantage of the synergy). However, this behavior is vulnerable to
“free-riders”: individuals that share in the pool but do not invest themselves. It can easily
be shown that the rational Nash equilibrium for this game is not to pay in, because this
strategy clearly dominates all others regardless of their play [1].
Hardin originally suggested that the tragedy of the commons can only be avoided
by punishing free riders [1]. Indeed, it has been shown that punishment can counteract
defectors effectively [16–26], but punishment is difficult to maintain because it is costly and
may reduce the mean payoffs of group members compared to groups in which punishment
of free-riders is not possible [27].
It was previously thought that punishment cannot be maintained in well-mixed
populations [28] so most of the literature has focused on the spatial version of the game,
where analytical results are difficult (but not impossible) to obtain [29]. More recent work
has uncovered a decidedly more complicated picture, in particular because punishment
can be performed in a number of different ways, that each change the dynamics of the
population considerably. For example, if the punisher also rewards cooperators at the
same time [30], complex dynamics that depend on the strength of punishment and the
size of the synergy can emerge in the spatial game, however the reward/punish strategy is
only stable in rare circumstances. It is also possible to punish in such a manner that the
severity of punishment depends on the number of defectors [31]. In the spatial version of
the game, introducing such an “adaptive” punishment leads to a strong enhancement of
the cooperative phase, as rare punishers protect the boundary between the phases with
maximum punishment. Another variation of punishment is to introduce a conditional
punisher, that scales punishment with the number of defectors in the group [32]. In that
game (also in the spatial setting), conditional and unconditional punishers cannot coexist,
and who ultimately wins depends on the strength of punishment. There are variations
of the Public Goods Game in which punishment can be maintained in other ways, for
example by voluntary punishment [29,33–36] or by using pool (that, is institutionalized)
as opposed to peer punishment [36–39], but we do not study those here.
A variant of the game that is closer to the one we study here involves probabilistic
punishment, where rather than punishing any defector with certainty, cooperators punish
with probability pi. Chen et al. [40] show that introducing a probability to punish changes
the fixed point structure of the game in the well-mixed regime so that a repulsive interior
fixed point can appear, and this enhances cooperation also in the spatial version of the
game.
Here we study the well-mixed version of the Public Goods game with probabilistic
punishment and probabilistic cooperation, establish a number of theoretical results that
suggest complex dynamics at the interface between the cooperating and defecting phases
(as a function of the synergy factor) and clarify the role of punishment as a catalyst of
cooperation in extensive agent-based simulations that agree with the theoretical results.
2. Mean field theory of Public Goods games
The Public Goods game emulates strategic decision making by groups, in which an
individual must select between different decisions that affect the group as a whole. Each
individual in a group of k+ 1 players (the focal player and her k participants) can decide
to cooperate by making a contribution of 1 unit to the public good, while defecting
individuals do not contribute.
The sum of all contributions from cooperating players is multiplied by r (the synergy
factor) and divided among all players. If NC is the number of cooperators within the group
(but not counting the focal player, i.e., NC ≤ k) and ND is the number of defectors, then
the cooperator obtains a payoff
PC = r
(NC + 1)
k + 1
− 1 (1)
compared to the defector’s
PD = r
NC
k + 1
. (2)
A dilemma exists if it is advantageous for the individual to defect, while mutual
cooperation would be best for all. Clearly a defector does better if PD − PC > 0, so
a dilemma exists only if r < k+ 1. At the same time, the payoff for a cooperator playing
within a group of cooperators should be larger than the payoff for a defector playing only
with defectors, that is, PC(NC = k) − PD(NC = 0) > 0 which implies r > 1. Thus, a
dilemma exists only for 1 < r < k + 1 (see Fig. 1). Standard evolutionary game theory
r0 1 k+1
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Figure 1. The phase diagram of the Public Goods game with a synergy factor r. Below
r = 1 defection is the strategy with the highest payoff and therefore favored by evolution.
Conversely, above r = k + 1 cooperation is evolutionarily favored. A dilemma exists in
the grey-shaded area between r = 1 and r = k+1, where cooperation would be beneficial
for a cooperating group as a whole, but defection is the Nash equilibrium point and thus
evolutionarily favored.
arguments imply that defection is the rational (and optimal) strategy for r < k+ 1, while
cooperation is selected for when r > k + 1. The synergy parameter r can thus be viewed
as a critical parameter, dialing a phase transition from defection to cooperation as r is
increased through k + 1. This transition is (in the limit of infinite population size and
vanishing mutation rate) of first-order (meaning an abrupt discontinuous transition from
defection to cooperation as the synergy parameter is raised across its critical value), as
can be seen from the replicator equation for the density of cooperators ρC
ρ˙C = ρC(1− ρC)(PC − PD) . (3)
Note that the Public Goods game turns into the standard Prisoner’s dilemma for k = 1,
with a dilemma for 1 < r < 2.
How can this dilemma be solved? How can evolution achieve cooperation in the grey-
shaded area in Fig. 1? The answer is: this is impossible unless additional mechanisms
change the critical point below rc = k + 1. One such mechanism investigated in the
literature is giving players the option to punish players who do not contribute. Following
the notation of Helbing et al. [26], defecting players suffer a fine β/k levied by each
punisher in the group, which costs each punisher a penalty γ/k. Let NM be the number of
players that cooperate as well as punish (the “moralists”) and NI the number of defectors
that punish (“immoralists”). As before, NC and ND are the number of players that
cooperate viz. defect but do not punish. The payoffs for the four possible strategies then
become
PC = r
(NC +NM + 1)
k + 1
− 1 , (4)
PD = r
(NC +NM)
k + 1
− β (ND +NI)
k
, (5)
PM = PC − γ (ND +NI)
k
, (6)
PI = PD − γ (ND +NI)
k
. (7)
2.1. Meean-field theory
Let us calculate the critical point for the game with punishment, assuming a well-mixed
population so that each player encounters on average the same fraction of strategies.
Introducing the mean density of cooperators ρC and the mean density of punishers ρP
ρC =
NC +NM
k
(8)
ρP =
NM +NI
k
, (9)
along with ρD =
ND+NI
k
we can write the average payoffs for each of the four strategies as
PC = r
(kρC + 1)
k + 1
− 1 , (10)
PD = r
kρC
k + 1
− βρP , (11)
PM = PC − γρD , (12)
PI = PD − γρD . (13)
Investigating PC − PD again, we notice that the area where the dilemma exists is now
shifted by βρP (see also Fig. 2):
1− βρP < r < (k + 1)(1− βρP ) . (14)
where the right boundary corresponds to the critical point rc = (k+1)(1−βρP ) separating
a cooperating and a defecting phase. Because we will be concerned with this critical point
from now on, let us introduce the re-scaled synergy parameter ξ = r/(k+ 1). The critical
point is then ξc = 1−βρP . According to standard population genetics, a single cooperating
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Figure 2. The phase diagram of the Public Goods game with a synergy factor r and
punishment. Compared to Fig. 1, the area where a dilemma occurs is shifted towards
lower r, implying that cooperation can occur for smaller r (right boundary of dilemma
area). A single defector cannot invade the population to the right of the critical point,
and a single cooperator cannot invade to the left of rc
individual cannot invade a population of defectors unless its fitness advantage PC −PD is
positive, which implies ξ > 1−βρP . However, if the entire population consists of defectors,
punishment is expected to be absent because defectors do not punish each other (i.e., we
assume here that immoralists do not matter in the long run, as was found in numerical
simulations [26]).
What happens if a group of cooperators (rather than a single individual) tries to
invade the defectors (or a group of defectors tries to invade the cooperators)? Because
the fitness of any group is frequency-dependent, we have to recalculate the mean fitness
of a group as follows: Assume a population of strategies given by the mean densities
(ρC , ρP ). Let us also assume that, in general, cooperators punish with a probability piC ,
while defectors punish with a probability piD. Then, ρP = piCρC+piDρD. The mean fitness
of a group of cooperators is then given by
w¯C = (1− piC)PC + piPM = PC − γpiCρD , (15)
using the payoffs (10-13), and the fitness advantage of the cooperating type with respect
to the defectors is
w¯C − w¯D = PC − PD − (piC − piD)γρD
= ξ − 1 + β(piC + piD)− (piC − piD)(β + γ)ρD . (16)
We will see in the numerical results below that immoralists go extinct quickly (because
they bear the double cost of meting out and receiving punishment). As a consequence,
we set piD = 0 (defectors don’t punish), and write the cooperator’s probability to punish
as piC ≡ pi, so that
w¯C − w¯D = ξ − 1 + βpi − pi(β + γ)ρD . (17)
Eq. (17) implies that punishment enables a “premature” phase transition to cooperation as
long as a “nucleus” of cooperators ρinC of sufficient size exists: a hallmark of metastability
(see Fig. 3). Thus, a “fluctuation” of pure moralists (ρinC = 1, pi = 1) is stable at ξ = 1−β,
which can be significantly smaller than 1 if the effect of punishment is large. However, the
opposite dynamics occur for groups of defectors: they can invade stable cooperators at
ξ > 1 as long as the density of invading defectors ρinD is large enough. As outlined in Fig. 3,
a “fluctuation” into all defectors ρinD = 1 is stable for ξ = 1+piγ, which can be substantially
larger than 1 when the defectors displace perfect moralists (pi = 1). Thus, punishment
enables both cooperation and defection in a meta-stable phase, away from the critical
point ξ = 1. This behavior is akin to the phenomenon of supercooling/superheating,
and can result in hysteresis: a population that starts in a defecting phase will stay in the
cooperating phase past the critical point ξ = 1 as ξ is raised adiabatically from low values,
and remain in the defecting phase past the critical point as ξ is lowered from high values
adiabatically. We will verify this behavior in the numerical simulations that follow.
3. Evolutionary simulation of Public Goods games
In this section we test the predictions of the (infinite population size) mean-field theory
using agent-based simulations with finite population size. The population consists of
1,024 individuals who each have four (randomly assigned) opponents, that is, we use
k = 4 throughout in the results presented here (with some results for k = 8). For
populations of this size, neutral drift is negligible and results do not change qualitatively
if populations are larger. However, the steepness of the transition between defection and
cooperation may depend on the population size in the standard manner expected from
finite-size scaling arguments (see, e.g., [41, p. 441]).
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Figure 3. Invasion probabilities for a fixed density of cooperators ρinC , as a function
of the critical parameter ξ. Cooperation is stable for ξ < 1 as long as the initial
density of cooperators ρinC is high. For ρ
in
C = 1, cooperators are stable at ξ = 1 − βpi,
which corresponds to the point (k + 1)(1 − βρP ) in Fig. 2. For general ρinC the critical
point is ξ = 1 − βpi + pi(β + γ)(1 − ρinC ), which may be larger or small than 1. For
ρinC=0, the critical point is actually to the right of the critical point in the absence of
punishment, that is, punishment hinders the establishment of cooperation. We sketch
invasion probabilities as continuous across the critical lines to indicate the effect of finite
population size. Increasing the population size creates steeper transitions approaching a
sudden transition.
3.1. Game dynamics and Genetic Algorithm
Since all opponents are also players, each individual plays k + 1 games per update. The
actual play of each individual is determined by their probabilities to cooperate pC and
to punish pP encoded as two genetic loci, which can be thought of as the outcome of a
network of genes that encode this decision. When mutating strategies, instead of mutating
the individual genes that make up the decision pathway, we simply replace the parental
probability pC by a uniformly drawn random number in the offspring. We will call the
locus encoding the probability pC simply the “C gene” and similarly for the punishment
gene.
When every individual has played against its k partners, 2 percent of the population
is replaced using a Moran-like process [42] in a well-mixed fashion. The Moran-like process
with a finite replacement rate interpolates between a true Moran process (replacement rate
equals to inverse population size) and a Wright-Fisher process, where the entire population
is replaced every update. In our replacement scheme, the identity of the players in any
group is unrelated to their ancestry so that, effectively, the members of a particular playing
group are randomly selected from the population [43]. With a replacement rate of 2%,
it takes on average 50 population updates until the entire population is replaced, that
is, a single generation has elapsed. In our simulations, the fitness of each individual is
cumulative, that is, the payoff obtained in the next update of the population is added
to the payoff already obtained (until that player is removed). However, we have tested
that zeroing out the fitness after each update does not alter the game dynamics. We also
verified that varying the replacement rate does not change the dynamics of the population
in this game, unlike in the case where strategies communicate [44]. Indeed, if strategies
make their play dependent on the last play, then replacing the opponent can introduce
noise into the communication, resulting in different levels of cooperation.
We verified that the probability for a player to encounter cooperators is independent
of whether that player is a cooperator or a defector, as is required for well-mixed
populations [45]. The accumulated payoff (fitness) is used to calculate the probability
that this player’s strategy will be chosen to replicate and fill the spot of a player that
was removed in the Moran process. In case payoffs (calculated according to the equations
above) are negative, we add a constant payoff to each and every strategy so that the
relative payoffs are unchanged (it is known that such an offset does not alter the population
dynamics). While the spatial version of the game shows somewhat different dynamics
than studied here, we study the well-mixed version because it is amenable to theoretical
prediction (see section 2).
The two genes of every individual mutate with a probability µ when replicated.
As mentioned earlier, mutating a probability replaces the probability with a uniformly
distributed random number. We used a fixed mutation probability (µ = 2% per locus)
in the results presented here, except when we test the influence of the mutation rate on
the broadening of the phase transition. We have previously studied the effect of varying
mutation rate in this game [46] and found only a weak dependence on the location of the
fixed point.
3.2. Line of Descent
After 500,000 updates, the line of descent (LOD) of the population is reconstructed [47,48],
by picking a random organism of the final population and following its ancestry all the
way back to the starting organism. This is possible because no recombination occurs
between genotypes: descent is entirely asexual. The LOD recapitulates the evolutionary
dynamic of the population, because it contains the successive list of genotypes that have
achieved fixation in the population. Because the population size is large, only a small
fraction of mutations (on the order 1/N where N is the population size) find themselves
on the LOD by chance. Thus, the LOD reflects the selective pressures operating on the
population, and the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory faithfully characterizes these
pressures. The ancestral genotype that anchors all lines of descent is given by the random
strategy pC = 0.5 and pP = 0.5. Because there is only one species in these populations,
the individual LODs of the population coalesce to a single LOD fairly rapidly (which is
why it is sufficient to pick a random genotype for following the LOD). In other words, the
common ancestor of the entire population is invariably fairly recent. To be certain that
we deal with LODs that have coalesced when calculating strategy fixed points from the
LOD, we routinely discard the last 50,000 updates (about 1,000 generations) from every
run. When determining evolutionary fixed points for the trajectory, we also discard the
first half, as the population trajectory may still be transient.
4. Results
4.1. Evolutionary trajectories and fixed points
As the strategies adapt to the environmental conditions (specified by the parameters that
define the game, including the neighborhood size, the mutation rate, and the replacement
rate), the probabilities change from their initial values (pC , pP ) = (0.5, 0.5) towards the
selected “fixed point” strategy. In order to visualize the evolutionary trajectory of a
population, we reconstruct the evolutionary line of descent of an experiment (LOD, see
section 3.2), which tells the story of that adaptation, mutation by mutation. While
the LOD in each particular run can show probabilities varying wildly, averaging many
such LODs can tell us about the selective pressures the populations face. In particular,
averaging the probabilities on the LODs after they have settled down, can tell us the fixed
point of evolutionary adaptation [44]. We determine this fixed point by discarding the
first 250,000 updates of every run (the transient), along with the last 50,000 (in order
to remove the dependence of the LOD on the randomly chosen anchor genotype) and
averaging the remaining 200,000 updates. Note that this fixed point is a computational
fixed point only: we do not mean to imply that the population’s genotypes all end up
on this exact point. Rather, due to the nature of the game and the selective pressures
that change as the composition of the population changes, the evolutionary trajectories
approach this point and then fluctuate around or near it. Thus, the fixed point reflects
the mean successful strategy given the conditions of the game.
We show in Fig. 4 the average trajectories for three different synergy factors r = 3, 4,
and 5 all anchored at the random strategy (pC , pP ) = (0.5, 0.5) that was used as the
seed strategy for every evolutionary run. We can see that, depending on the synergy
(and the values chosen for the cost and effect of punishment), populations evolve towards
a cooperating or defecting fixed point, and take different trajectories to get there. For
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Figure 4. Evolutionary trajectories for different synergies. Evolution of
strategies (pC , pP ) on the LOD for synergy factors r = 3 (black), r = 4 (green), and
r = 5 (red). All trajectories originate at (0.5,0.5). We show an average of the LOD of
10 runs each. Here, β = 0.8, γ = 0.2, and µ = 2%.
r = 3, synergy is too low to lead to cooperation, and the fixed point of that trajectory
is (pC , pP ) = (0, 0), that is, defection. For r = 4, however, the population moves toward
a fixed point centered around (pC , pP ) = (0.7, 0.2), that is, players cooperate most of the
time. (The location of the endpoint of the trajectory does not depend on the starting
point.) Note, however, that the players engage in punishment only sparingly. For r = 5,
cooperation is almost fully established, while punishment occurs about 40% of the time on
average. However, the average trajectory (average over ten independent runs) only tells
part of the story, because at this level of cooperation there is very little difference between
a punishing and a non-punishing player (given there are very few players to punish) and as
a consequence the punishment gene has begun to drift. An unselected (and thus drifting)
probability pP is a uniformly distributed random number, with mean 1/2 and variance
1/12. As pC → 1, the average pP and its variance approach precisely these numbers.
When mapping the strategy fixed point (average strategy on the LOD over 20
independent runs, again discarding the transient and the last 50,000) as a function of
the parameters β (effectiveness) and γ (cost) of punishment (defined in section 2) each in
the range from 0.0 to 1.0 and at low synergy r = 3.0, we find that defection is the most
prevalent strategy on the LOD (see Figure 5A), as was found previously [25, 26]. When
γ = 0 there is no cost associated with the punishment, which implies that the P gene is
not under selection and drifts. Thus, for this value of synergy (and lower), we find that
the strategy fixed point is defection without punishment, except for the values γ = 0,
where punishment is random.
As the degree of synergy increases to r = 3.5, cooperation starts to appear even in
this well-mixed population (see Fig. 5B), while it appears as early as r = 2 for sufficiently
high β and low γ in the spatial (but deterministic) version of the game, see [25, 26]. For
r = 4 we find players cooperating (pC ≈ 0.8) at high β and low γ which indicates that
under conditions where punishment is not very costly or even free, punishment pays off.
In addition we notice that the probability to punish increases under the same conditions
that allows cooperation (high β and low γ, that is high impact, low cost of punishment),
indicating that punishment is indeed used to enforce cooperation (Fig. 5C). The mean
punishment probability grows to 0.5, but at the same time the variance shows that this
gene is not under selection (as long as γ 6= 0).
Increasing the synergy level even more towards r = 4.5 we witness the emergence
of dominance of cooperation (pC > 0.5) for most of the range of punishment cost and
effectiveness, see Figure 5D. At the same time the punishment probability reaches 0.5 for
a larger range of parameters, but the mean punishment probability on the LOD never
exceeds 0.5, implying that full persistent punishment is not stable, and probably not
necessary. Note that, in an implementation where decisions are deterministic (such as in
the implementation of Helbing et al. [26]), punishment may remain for a long time in the
population even though it is not selected anymore. In that case, players that cooperate
with and without punishment have exactly the same fitness, and one or the other strategy
should only dominate by drifting to fixation neutrally, a process that can take a significant
amount of time in large populations such as those studied in Ref. [26].
Critical dynamics and the role of punishment
Previously, a phase transition between cooperative and defective behavior in the Public
Goods game as a function of the synergy r was observed for the spatial version [25,28,29]
of the game (but not the well-mixed version). We can study the critical point and
its dependence on punishment in detail in the well-mixed version of the game, where
analytical predictions (as outlined above) are available. We show in Fig. 6 the average
probability to cooperate (solid line) and to punish (dashed line) as a function of synergy
for our default values γ = 0.2 and β = 0.8. Cooperation sets in at r = 4 and becomes
prevalent for synergies just exceeding that. The simulations show that the phase transition
is broadened from the expected first-order behavior, owing to two factors: finite population
size and finite mutation rate. The inset in Fig. 6 shows the transition in the absence
of punishment at two different mutation rates, suggesting that mutations introduce
“disorder-broadening” [49], which can lead to complete “rounding” of the discontinuous
transition.
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Figure 5. Mean probabilities for cooperation pC and punishment pP at the
evolutionary fixed point. These graphs show the fixed point (averaged over 20 LODs)
as a function of the cost of punishment γ and the effectiveness of punishment β, for
different values of the synergy r. Left panel: probability to cooperate pC , right panel:
probability to punish pP . Note the inversion of the β and γ scales for better visibility.
Mutation rate is set to µ = 2% per probability throughout. A: For r = 3, cooperation
does not evolve except when punishment is free (γ = 0), and even then only if punishment
is very effective (β close to 1). At γ = 0, the punishment gene drifts neutrally. B: For
r = 3.5 defection is still the predominant strategy except for very low γ and high β.
C: At r = 4, cooperation is fully established for low γ and high β, but not for medium
values. D: For r = 4.5 cooperation is the dominant strategy for all values of the cost γ,
and for high effect (β > 0.75). Note that the average punishment probability pP never
exceeds 0.5 (the value achieved when the gene drifts neutrally).
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Figure 6. Mean probability of cooperation and punishment. Probability of
cooperation pC (solid, left scale) and probability of punishment pP (dashed, right scale)
with adaptive punishment at the evolutionary fixed point of the trajectory, as a function
of the synergy r (β = 0.8, γ = 0.2, µ = 2%, 100 replicates for each data point). The
probability to cooperate when punishment is forced to zero (pP = 0) is shown in the
inset, for two different mutation rates: (µ = 2% (dashed) and µ = 1% (solid).
We will now study how punishment affects the critical point. The average probability
of cooperation in Fig. 6 shows the typical behavior of an order parameter as a function of
the critical parameter r in a broadened first-order transition. Thus, although punishment
is sporadic when it is possible–and drifts when cooperation is established–it is essential to
lower the critical barrier for cooperation. The probability distribution of the punishment
gene throughout the population (Fig. 7) shows that punishment is never prevalent: it is
absent below the critical point, while the distribution is close to uniform (because of drift)
above it. In a sense, punishment catalyzes the transition from defection to cooperation.
Note also that the levels of cooperation achieved (at a given r) are significantly higher
when punishment exists, even though punishment is only weakly selected for. Apparently,
the possibility of punishment alone is sufficient to enforce higher levels of cooperation,
but the mechanism for this enforcement is not immediately clear as punishment is rare
above the critical point.
In section 2 we calculated approximately the point at which cooperation is favored
in a mean-field approach that does not take mutations into account, by writing Eqs. (4-5)
in terms of the density of cooperators ρC encountered by players in a group, and found
that cooperation was favored as long as
r > (k + 1)(1− βρP ) . (18)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
pP
r=4.0
r=4.15
r=4.5
Figure 7. Histogram of the punishment probability distribution. Punishment
probability distribution in a typical equilibrated population, just before the critical point
(r = 4, black), at the critical point (r = 4.15, grey), and above rcrit (r = 4.5, white).
This equation (which also follows from a replicator equation approach for the
corresponding deterministic game) implies that the emergence of cooperation depends
crucially on the density of punishers. In fact, the mean-field theory predicts that
cooperation in the absence of punishment is favored only at r = 5. We see cooperation
emerge quite a bit earlier than that in our simulations (see inset in Fig. 6), but crosses
pC = 0.5 very close to r = 5, as predicted by the mean field theory. Of course, the
departure from the mean-field theory results is a consequence of the finite population
size and mutation rate of the simulations. We also note that while the simulations
suggest a stable fixed point pC < 1 above the critical point, this does not mean that
the corresponding fixed point for the deterministic game admits a stable mixture of
cooperating and defecting strategies. While from general arguments the fixed point of
the stochastic game must be given by the corresponding fixed point of the deterministic
game [50] (see also [51]), the “broadening” of the phase transition via mutations (the
equivalent of random quenched impurities [49]) leads to a stochastic fixed point with
pC < 1. But note that this fixed point is statistical only: for each run the trajectory
fluctuates around this point.
We can test Eq. (18) explicitly by finding the critical r at which pC crosses 0.5 for
simulations in which the punishment probability is held fixed, so that ρP ≈ pP . To find the
critical point, we performed 100 simulations each at fixed r with small increments ∆r and
interpolated the data within the steep portion of the transition to find the crossover point.
The curves in Fig. 8 show that the steepness of the transition between cooperation and
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Figure 8. Critical point at fixed punishment for k = 4. A: Mean probability to
cooperate averaged over 100 independent lines of descent (average over 200K updates,
discarding the first 250K and the last 50K as described in section 3.2, as a function of
synergy r for fixed (unevolvable) probability of punishment pP=0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and
1.0. The dashed line indicates a mean probability to cooperate pC = 0.5, which we us
to extrapolate the critical value rc. This critical value depends on the punishment levels
as predicted by Eq. (18). B: Critical synergy rc as a function of punishment probability
pP as deduced from panel A (points) by identifying the rcrit at which the cooperation
probability pC = 0.5. The dashed line indicates the prediction rc = 5(1−βρP ), assuming
that the density of cooperators ρP ≈ pP (mean field), with β = 0.8 and γ = 0.2.
defection depends on the level of punishment, changing from a dependence reminiscent
of second-order transitions (at vanishing punishment) towards a first-order-like transition
at high punishment. We plot the critical line rc = (k + 1)(1 − βρP ) in Fig. 8 for k = 4
and β = 0.8 (rc = 5 − 4pP ). The mean field theory reproduces the simulated rc within
errors. The prediction in fact works just as well for other parameter values: we tested
k = 8 (each agent plays with eight random other agents) and readily observe that the
critical value is given by rc = 10− 8pP (data not shown).
Because of the crucial importance of punishers in determining the synergy level at
which cooperation emerges, the Public Goods game with a genetic basis (that is, with
genes coding for probabilities of moves) implies curious dynamics close to the critical point.
Below the critical point, defection is a stable strategy, and punishment is absent. When
cooperation emerges as a possibility, punishment becomes more and more important,
leading to a lowering of the critical synergy for cooperation via Eq. (18). At that point,
cooperation emerges rapidly and decisively once a critical level of punishment has been
achieved. Once cooperation is dominant and defectors are all but driven to extinction,
punishment becomes irrelevant and the gene for punishment begins to drift. As this
happens, the fraction of punishers drops, thus raising the critical synergy according to
Eq. (18). As a consequence, a drifting punishment gene can lead to the sudden re-
emergence of defectors as stable states. Once those have taken over, the reverse dynamics
begins to unfold. Given this dynamic, we should observe periods of cooperation and
defection that follow each other closely when the synergy is near the critical point.
These dynamics are reminiscent of the phenomenon of supercooling and superheating
in certain phase transitions observed in condensed matter physics, as predicted in
section 2. If we imagine the synergy parameter r as the critical parameter and the
mean probability to cooperate as the order parameter, it is possible that when r is slowly
increased, the population remains in the defecting phase because a switch to cooperation
requires a critical number of cooperators as a “seed”. In such a situation, the defecting
phase is unstable to fluctuations. If a critical number of cooperators emerges by chance,
punishment immediately becomes effective against defectors, lowers the critical point as
implied by Eq. (18), and the population could transition to cooperation very quickly. A
hallmark of such bi-stable systems that require nucleation events in order to transition
is hysteresis, a phenomenon where the state of the system depends on its history. We
can test whether hysteresis exists in the Public Goods game (and whether the strength of
this effect depends on the probability to punish), by adiabatically changing the synergy
parameter first from low to high (transitioning from defection to cooperation), and then
adiabatically back from high to low. While we see evidence of hysteresis even when
punishment is absent (Fig. 9A), the effect is much more pronounced when punishment
is possible (Fig. 9B). The population moves from cooperation to defection at about the
expected critical synergy rcrit ≈ 4.15 as r is decreased, but stays in the defecting phase
much beyond the critical point as r is increased.
The observed hysteresis effect implies that once cooperation is established, it can be
maintained even when the expected synergy fluctuates below the critical point, but that
cooperation is difficult to establish even when the synergy would be conducive for that
establishment. It also explains why levels of cooperation are higher when punishment is
possible, even if punishment is used sparingly. In meta-stable phase transitions, bubbles
of the new phase increase in size exponentially if larger than a critical size, but shrink
exponentially when smaller than the critical size [52]. Thus, if a group invades with
ρinC > ρcrit, ρC → 1. This is different from the dynamics in the absence of punishment,
where at the critical point all ρinC have the same fitness, and the mean level of cooperation
is 0.5, as is evident in Fig. 4 (inset), and Fig. 8A. Indeed, the critical point for ρP = 0
(no punishment) is neutral, while it is a repulsive fixed point when punishment is present.
As a consequence, the phase transition as a function of r becomes steeper and steeper
as punishment increases, and higher levels of cooperation are achieved. This behavior is
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Figure 9. Hysteresis effect from punishment. Population fraction of cooperators
(measured as the density of non-punishing cooperators plus the density of moralists) as
a function of synergy r when r is adiabatically changed from low to high values (solid),
and back from high values to low values (dashed). A: no punishment. B: Adaptive
punishment with β = 0.8 and γ = 0.2. All population fractions are started at 0.5 (either
at the high or low end of r). The lines show the average over 100 runs. Standard error
is of the size of the fluctuations.
strongly reminiscent of phase transitions in ferromagnetic systems where the “rounding”
of the transition due to impurities is reduced via the magnetic field. This suggests that a
treatment of Public Goods games in terms of Ising-like models where punishment plays
the role of a magnetic field forcing the alignment of spins should be possible, and we are
currently pursuing such an approach [53].
5. Discussion
We studied the Public Goods game for well-mixed populations both theoretically and in
agent-based simulations of Darwinian evolution of stochastic strategies, using genes that
encode the probabilities for cooperation and punishment. It is known that punishment
can drive the evolution of cooperation above a critical synergy level as long as there is a
spatial structure in the environment [25,26]. It was also previously believed that in well-
mixed populations cooperation via punishment can only become successful if additional
factors like reputation [22] or the potential for abstaining from the public good [29,34] are
influencing the evolution. Here we show that cooperation readily emerges in a well-mixed
environment above a critical level of synergy. This critical level is influenced by a number
of factors: the rate of punishment because punishment favors cooperating groups, but
also spatial structure [25, 28, 29], because a single cooperator can nucleate a transition
simply because offspring cooperators are placed next to it, giving rise to a “bubble” of
cooperators of sufficient size. This finding is similar to the observation of frequency-
dependent cooperation when punishment (but not cooperation) is probabilistic [40], even
though the game studied by Chen et al. is different from the game we consider here in
that punishment is shared among the punisher, whereas in our game (which is the one
studied by Helbing et al. [26]), each punisher acts on his own.
We have not studied here the possibility of “anti-social” punishment [19,54,55], where
non-cooperating defectors can punish cooperators, but we do not expect this possibility
to change the overall picture. Indeed, in simulations in which defection was not punished
but instead rewarded (a negative punishment), this only served to reinforce the defecting
phase, as was also found in [56]. A transition to the cooperative phase still takes place at
sufficiently high synergy. Phase transitions between cooperative and defection phases have
also been observed in a spatial version of the Public Goods game where costly rewards
are given for cooperation, rather than the costly punishment for defectors [57]. It would
be interesting to study this game within the context of evolving probabilistic strategies.
We conclude that in well-mixed populations cooperation can emerge if the synergy
outweighs the defectors’ reward, which is reduced by punishment. A punishment-
dependent barrier to cooperation introduces an interesting dynamic near the critical
synergy. Starting in the cooperative phase, as long as the mutation rate is low enough,
the dearth of defectors in the cooperating phase makes punishment obsolete, that is,
the selective pressure to punish disappears. As a consequence, the density of punishers
decreases, thus increasing the critical point in turn. If the critical synergy has increased
sufficiently, defectors can again gain a foothold. Such a shift, however, reinstates the
selective pressure to punish, leading to a re-emergence of moralists that can drive defectors
out once more. Thus, for synergy factors near the critical point, we can expect oscillations
between cooperators and defectors, and no strategy is ever stable.
Finally, the observation of hysteresis implies the existence of metastable states, and
gives rise to a self-enforcing (or “self-aligning”) dynamic where cooperation is stable
even when punishment is never actually used. It is clear that meta-stable dynamics
can only occur in the shaded region in Fig. 3, which is set by the probability pi with
which cooperators punish, and provides a mechanism to protect cooperating groups from
defectors, as the defectors need to achieve a critical density in order to thrive. In a very
real way, meta-stability raises the scepter of punishment to maintain cooperation, even
when it is not used.
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